POLITICAL SYMBOLISM AND BALANCE OF POWER :
THE CASE OF THE DANISH REPUBLICAN MONARCHY
by Jean-Pierre Airut, Centre de recherches politiques Raymond Aron (EHESS, Paris).
1. In this paper I will try to justify the following statements : a) « Constitutional science », i. e. political sociology and constitutionnal law, tend to loose interest in symbols and symbolic function ; b) The analysis of the cult of the Danish flag allows us to believe that symbols are quite capable, by acting upon the attitude and behaviour of the « constitutionnal actors[1] », of influencing a political system to the point of modifying the here dominant balance of power.
2. By « symbolic function », we mean the mission that an association of people confers upon an objective organ (e. g. a flag) or a subjective organ (e. g. an individual) of representing their community in the spirit of its members as well as in that of its counterparts.
We have to remark that « constitutional science » takes no interest in this function, not even when it is up to a monarch, the most evident and spectacular symbolic organ, to exercise it. This lack of interest is such that it can even be observed in countries of monarchic tradition thus it is only because a Belgian author served his King directly that he explains how he became aware of the king’s symbolic and representative functions and of the need to dedicate them a specific, albeit short, chapter[2].
3. The reasoning that constitutionnal science cannot avoird dedicating to the symblic function appears to be often limited, abstract or contradictory.
– Limited, as « constitutionnal science » restricts itself to observing that the symbolic function exists, that it resides mostly with an individual — elected president, dictator or monarch — who bears the title of « Head of State », and that the parliamentary system separates this function from the other functions that defines a State[3], as it is bestowed upon a president or monarch devoid almost entirely of executive, legislative or judiciary power.
– Abstract, because after declaring the importance in principle of the symbols, « constitutionnal science » gives it in fact little attention. One of the best and most ponderous French treatises of the moment on political science[4] neglects to expand upon the subject of the « Head of State » of parliamentary systems, the most widespread system among democratic States and the only one where the symbolic function appears in its purest form as it is separated from the other functions !
– Contradictory, since the definitions that « constitutional science » uses to qualify the Head of parliamentary State are not at all consistent with his mission. Why should the powers of a monarch or a president be termed « nominal[5] », « formal [6]», « protocollar [7]», « apparent[8] », « theatrical[9] », « subordinated[10] » or « unreal[11] » if they have, as is written by some authors, the effect of « unifying[12] » the nation, that is to say creating or preserving it ? If the King is only an ornament or a « crowned flower-pot[13] », why do people give to this personality rather than to the holder of real power, the title of « head of State » and at the same time the supreme responsability of the Nation ? Either people dont know what they do or constitutional science cannot measure how far its reasoning goes.
How else tcan one explain why so many people — regicides as in the case of Great Britain, liberals as in the case of the Netherlands, republicans as in that of Spain or egalitarians as in that of Scandinavia — preserve or restore at such a high cost their constitutional monarch if the latter is only the « pale reflection (of his) past splendor[14] », i. e. …. ?
It is in fact not surprising that, as a result of these limitations, abstractions or contradictions, the survival of the British monarchy appears a « mystery[15] » to one of the réputés French constitutionalists, as he is honest enough to admit.
4. Three factors might explain this (the) lack of interest (or the above-described mystery). When the organ exercising the symbolic function is a monarch, this will provoke the amused or « aristocratic » contempt of a great many « intellectuals » of the republican systems and of a large minority of « intellectuals » belonging to the monarchical systems. A contempt urging them to ignore or refuse this function, in principle, any possible rationality.
Besides, the symbolic function in itself is difficult to observe. Whether the organ exercising it is presidential or monarchist, it is « little formalised[16] ». The rules regulating its organization as well as its exercise often derive from habit and are rarely formulated, whenever written down, in those texts to which constitutionalists and sociologists refer when reconstituting the institutions they are studying. The rules which organize the objective symbolic organ (flag) usage are not more « formalised » than those which define the usage of the subjective organ (king, president).
We believe that one last factor might explain this lack of interest or the misunderstanding shown by « constitutional science » towards the symbolic function : the definition of sign and of symbol that linguistics attribute to it — in particular through Anthropology and Sociology. Even admitting that this definition answers the needs of the discipline founded by Ferdinand de Saussure, this does not mean that it answers those of other social sciences. The latter may well affirm as they do through Marcel Mauss[17] or Claude Levi-Strauss[18], for instance, that symbols are indispensable to social life and cannot be separated from it, still they define them in a way that does not allow the symbols to explain how and why they act in actual fact.
« Symbol : representation by a concrete object of another which is generally not concrete[19] ». For the author of this definition, as for most specialists, the symbol is a visual or sonic object, i. e. a « signifier» (e. g. the image of a lion ) which designates a reality that is temporarily or naturally inaccessible to the senses, i. e. a « signified » (e. g. the ideal of courage ).
Once the symbol has the only or main function of « expressing[20] » the signified, it draws its reason for existence from that signified in a way that it can only exist by it and through it. As it is reduced to a simple derived and secondary effect, it could never be considered a factor capable of producing effects of its own.
Compared to the signified, of which it is a sort of epiphenomenon, the symbol seems less consistent, less important, and therefore less interesting[21]. By attributing to it an essentially « expressive » function, the anthropological definition tends to reduces the symbol to an aesthetic, not a political phenemonon : comparing a constitutional monarch or president of a parliamentary system to an « ornament » or a « crowned flower-pot » as certain authors have written (as seen above), clearly confirms the assumption.
5. As we are unable to reconcile werstern intelligentzia to the monarchic idea and symbolism and as we cannot neither obtain the codification of the rules regulating the symbolic function in a republic as well as in a monarchy, we may try to clarify the concept of symbol in ordrer to adapt it, as much as possible, to the needs of what we have called « constitutional science ».
Even if the symbol is, by definition « signifier » and like the effect of signified, it is never created by its signified, nor by some sign system acting by itself like an automaton or a « structure »[22].
As one realize, a symbol is always originated by humans of flesh and blood, acting in a defined context and towards defined ends. If men conceive, produce and reproduce symbols, it is not only because they wish to « express » or « represent » a signified ; they do so because this representation may be perceived or contemplated by others, or even by themselves.
If they wish the symbol to be seen, this is because it carries a message they wish to divulge in order to modify information, a state of consciousness, and, however indirectly, the behaviour of the recipients.
The New Cultural history[23] issued by the « ceremonialist school » is based just upon this definition of a symbol. If we consider revolutionary symbolism in order to define the political culture that the men of 1789 have promoted beyond their doctrinal affirmations and their official behavior[24], it presupposes more or less explicitly that symbols contribute to the change of mentalities and institutions, besides expressing them[25].
The effect of the sight of a flag on a soldiers’ardor which induced the belligerents in 1914-1918 to abstain from using flags on battlefields, confirms the existence of the link capable of uniting the symbol with behabior itself[26]. The symbol is not only a sign and effect, it is also a signal and factor.
6. This definition of symbol enables us to understand, if however we explain the concept of law at the same time, that the former intends to orient and nothing more, by its own means, what the latter itself endeavours to shape.
« Law : a body of rules in force within a given juridical order ». « Legal rules : norms or prescriptive terms ». These two definitions of law and rule tend to conceal what is meant by the diffrence established by the law between obligations or rights « to do » and obligations or rights « not to do ». Whether our time may like it or not[27], law’s function is certainly that of orienting and shaping the spontaneous behavior (the « to do » or « not to do ») by prescribing not any « proposition », as the second definition would prompt us to believe, but instead models of behavior — economic in the case of economic law, familiar, for instance in the case of civil law or political in the case of constitutional law.
Thanks to the audience it gained, Hans Kelsen’s definition, tending to assimilate the ideal of law to that of « regulation », might explain why contemporary specialists, rather more than laymen[28] or their predecessors[29], proceed to the corporal, behavioral or material purification, of established law[30].
Since law’s function is clearly that of shaping human behavior, we are forced to realize that it competes with at least three other factors of behavior : human nature and its « instinctive » behavior, « reflexes » or « pulsions » as one may prefer ; pure violence, mother of the « right » of the strongest , and the whole of the technics which, through messages and the help of interposed communication persuade people to conform in their behavior to a priori defined models : advertising which modifies buying behavior ; sermons and catechesis which model religious and social behavior , bul also speeches, and above all, relating to our subject, political symbols orienting electoral vote, etc.[31]
To insure that this conclusion, a bit theoretical perhaps, stands up to the test of reality, we propose to illustrate the effects that a concrete symbol — the Danish national flag, the Dannebrog — can have on a political regime, itself rather concrete — in this case, the Danish constitutional monarchy. Limited in time, we will thus examine but two of the numerous effects that the Dannebrog engenders.
7. The use of national colors takes on the allure, in Denmark, of what one must call a cult. All along the year, they are present in the most diverse of circumstances involving both public and private life.
– Ordinary circumstances : decoration of public buildings ; streamers indicating the location of a store and wheter it is opened or closed ; and decorations associated with daily life : grocery sacs, gift wrapping paper, lunch-boxes that Danish children bring with them to school ;
– Cyclic extraordinary circumstances : national holidays ; religious feasts (Christmas, Easter) ; private but non-profit-making feasts (anniversaries, end-of-the-year professional dinners, reception of family or friends returning from abroad) ; private commercial events (promotions and end-of-the-year sales) ;
– Mainly unique extraordinary circumstances : marriages, baptisms, funerals, secondary school graduation banquets, professional jubilees.
If the Dannebrog can be seen on all occasions, it is also present everywhere : at the top of flag poles rising up from concessionary « colonial gardens », at the entrance to towns, in the fashion of a working class garden from the end of the last century replacing country houses ; at the extremity of flag staffs attached to the balconies of private homes ; along highway exits leading to buildings where a private party is organized ; on backpacks or on the bicyles of children celebrating their birthday ; on promotional products ; above, in front of or in the dsiplay windows of shops promoting end-of-year sales; etc.
This omnipresence has a consequence which will show itself, in what follows, or that of having its own importance : because the Dannebrog belongs to all places and all times, it can be seen in all hands : those of civil, military and religious civil servants ; but also those of ordinary individuals whether adults or minors.
Certains legal rules confer to different uses a sacred character. Flags, respecting the dimensions and form which define a national flag stricto sensu, will not, except under threat of penal sanction, be raised or lowered but at sun rise and sunset, respectively, and after having been unfolded or folded following a well defined ceremony.
By saluting the national colors in their gardens[32] as is practiced in the United States, individuals execute the most important part of the Christian sacrament, communion, certainly not here with God but rather with their forefathers and country. Communion, the right to exercise of which belongs, in most countries, but to military or political authorities.
Another indication confirms the reality of the cult of the Dannebrog, or the attitude « pietist » which appears to be associated with it. With the simple mentioning of their flag, tears, quickly held back, wet the eyes of certains now voiceless Danes, whether young or not.
A remainder of childhood, Christmas and Easter feasts as well as all those important moments in one’s existence, the Dannebrog would very well recuperate to the service of national sentiment, family, amicable and religious affectivity to which numerous of its usages are linked.
8. Up to a few years ago, the Danes were only slightly conscious of using their flag in such an usual way. This could explain the fact that their intellectuals are more interested in the heraldy of the Dannebrog than the forms of and reasons for its use.
It appears that its cult was formed, without a doubt quite progressively, after the revolution of 1848. In 1834, king Christian VII forbade his subjects from using the Dannebrog, at this time his emblem. The reasons behind this interdiction are today obscure to the extent that we only know that his subjects, up to this time did not use his flag ! The use made of the Dannebrog after 1848 was such that Frederick VII had to revoke, in 1854, the interdiction of his predecessor.
The hypothesis that had been formulated to explain the development of this spontaneous use[33] has not yet been contested : the resistance of the sovereign to this democratization to which he was so little resigned, could have transformed the interdiction of 1834 into a political issue, making a symbole for which the Danes had no need, one which they were determined to use only because its use had been previously forbidden by the absolute monarch…
Through « Valdemar Day » or « Flag Day »; celebrated 15 June, Denmark seems to have made official, in 1912, the cult that its inhabitants consecrate to the Dannebrog. What is the official object of this celebration ? Commemorate, the victory of Lyndanis (15 June 1219), during which God had, according a legend kept alive by schools as well families and the press, sent to Danish crusaders under the leadership ov king Valdemar, the first Dannebrog to assure them of his support and to give them, at the moment of their weakening, the force to win over the pagan Estonians camped on their own territory.
9. Since the Danish monarchy was dispossessed of its ordinary power to represent the will of the political body that it had kept up to this point (discretionary choice of the Prime Minister), it has had as its principal role the providing for abroad and to the Danes of a
« sensorial » and imaginary representation of the Danish nation : in perceiving the Danish monarch by either sight or sound or by evoking its figure in ones imagination, each and every Dane represents Denmark. The monarch is nevertheless not alone in exercising this role since the Dannebrog cult competes with him for his monopoly. The competititon of the latter is, in effect, exercised in the domain of the affective. Although the Dannebrog is an « objective » symbol, it gives rise to, as we have seen, affects that only subjective symbols, and above all monarchs, are accustomed to producing.
The competition of the Dannebrog is even more active as it extends equally into the domain of the semantic where it lessens the monarchical « signified ».
At the time when the king had a monopoly over the symbolic, he summed up, alone, all of the aspects of Denmark. Since the enthroning of the Dannebrog, he connotes probably more the State, the tradition and the human group than the territroy, country and way of life. Among the « dyarchs », the rivalry is as strong as it is complementary.
The competition of the Dannebrog is, finally, quantitatve. Due to its omnipresence, it limites in an almost quasi mechanical manner, in effect, the quantity of space occupied by the king in the « collective imagination », i. e. in the consciousness of each of his subjects.
This global competition does not exist without weakening — proof that symbols have their own effets — the power to represent the will of the political body that the monarch conserves only when needed to arbitrate. When a crisis arises between the constituted powers[34] or the country and its neighbors[35], the king, authority guaranteeing national unity, will have a less important psychic hold over his subjects when attempting to impose his arbitration or to assemble the nation around his person : it is more and more through the intermediary of those responsible for the crisis (governement, partis, etc.) than royal authority, by definition foreign to the crisis due to its purely symbolic role, that the people will tend to have their interests represented. As low as it be, it is not exagerated to say that the cult of the flag brings about, without striking a blow, a « symbolic coup d’Etat ». Another indication illustrates that the Dannebrog has become the other king of Denmark as to the end of this constitutional « putsch »: the creation of « Flag Day », day by which the Dannebrog is accorded a privilege habitually reserved but for the monarch : the celebration of his birth !
It is of little importance that this celebration provokes, contrary to the celebration of the King or Queen, no demonstration of popular rejoicing. By permitting the subjects who want to, and they are numerous, to sell or buy, in all of the streets of the Kingdom, small paper Dannebrogs in order to pay for the flags which will serve as public decoration as well as the publication of brochures vulgarizing the rules of their use », « Flag Day » brings about real and active popular participation. And, it is not absurd to think that its institution makes official the symbolic coup d’etat that the development of the Dannebrog cult has already establiched in a de facto manner[36].
10. The Dannebrog cult modulates the political regime in a second way : at the same time that it turns the society into a State, it turns the State into a Society in the interest of their cooperation. By permitting the subjects of the Queen to put out the flags as would her soldiers and civil servants, the cult makes relative, in the cousciousness of the Danes, the distinction between civil servant/administered, State/civil society, government/governed, distinction which in other societies (France and Catholic countries[37]) has a quasi absolute value. On seeing one’s father or neighbor religiously salute the country’s colors, an infant enters not only into the game but tends equally, in effect, to interiorize the rule, purely habitual, which wants the Danish citizen to perceive and behave as an integral part of the State. The fact that the French refuse more and more their flag entry into their homes, even on the 14 of July, prove that the ritual is sufficient to enclose the believer in a role and a personality[38].
Observation tends to confirme that the pivatization of the public cult of the Dannebrog and the relativization of the separation of society into civil/State favors the emergence of attitudes and behavior making easier the intense « collaboration of powers » which prevail between the Danish State and the Danish People engendering, thus, concrete political effects. For a long time, the Danes have been, more than elswhere, associated with the elaboration of the country’s political decisions[39] : in school where parents and professors are not far form governing with regard to the headmaster, the term local or direct democracy finds all of its relevance[40]. Identifying naturally with the State into which they are assimilated and with whom they participate in a concrete manner, the Danes respect voluntarily the laws, as in the most ideal of Republics[41].
Although the cult of the Dannebrog is not in itself sufficient to foster Danish civic spirit, it is likely one of the means by which the latter, in the form of a display or by exemple, launches forth capturing opinion and is transmitted from generation to generation.
11. But the cult is source of yet another effect : at the same time that it « monarchizes » the citizen it democratizes the elite.
Birthdays, baptisms and funerals are events of private life. What could be more banal, indeed, that the passage of time and the death of … mortals ? This private characteristic is such that a president must be in office for his death to constitute a public event. Only the events in the private life of the king have as a vocation being public : his body merges with that of the nation to the point that the day of his birthday is equivalent to the « National Holiday » that republics are accustomed to organizing.
By using the flag on their birthday or for the funerals of those close to them, the Danes display to their neighbors and the public episodes of their private life : whether the flag is raised to the summit of the mast or brought to half-mast, neighbors and passers-by understand, indeed, that a happy or sad event is being observed.
Acting thus, the Danes behave as though they were kings. To establish a democratic regime, the French did away the function of king ; the Danes preferred rather to make each subject equal to a king. If it is true that the privatization of the cult of the flag contributed to the democratization of Danish life, it is much more due to the transformation of each Dane into a Lord of the House of Lords than a representative in the House of Commons.
12. Le dernier effet dont nous parlerons ici est celui par lequel le Dannebrog démocratise l’Etat et la société danois. Il y parvient en faisant indirectement du roi, ce « résidu » apparent de l’absolutisme des temps anciens, un des plus sûrs ferments de la démocratie moderne.
Le message mis en spectacle, poétisé et diffusé par le Dannebrog s’adresse, en effet, au monarque aussi bien qu’au citoyen. Si, au Danemark, le citoyen est roi, le roi n’est plus qu’un roi parmi d’autres. En dépit de son titre et du fait qu’il est seul à exercer sa fonction, il ne saurait être qu’un primus inter pares ainsi que la mise en scène publique par le Dannebrog de la vie privée de chaque danois le lui rappelle à chaque instant. Et de fait, rien ne réjouit plus les Danois que le spectacle de leur Reine faisant ses emplettes — sans escorte ni courtisan — aussi simplement que n’importe lequel d’entre eux[42].
En démontrant qu’il est possible de joindre à l’extraction la plus haute la plus stricte humilité, le monarque condense, cristallise, magnifie les attentes morales de son peuple ; il devient l’exemple vivant de la manière dont tout Danois qui se respecte doit se comporter, le foyer au contact duquel chacun peut venir prendre conscience de son identité, alimenter sa foi en son destin d’homme libre[43], faire provision de ce qui, selon Montesquieu, est au « principe » même du régime républicain, à savoir la « vertu[44] ».
Se pratiquant à l’adresse de tous, exceptions faites de la Reine et de quelques anciens, le tutoiement est de mise depuis plus de vingt ans. Sans que la taille du pays suffise à l’expliquer, responsables politiques, économiques et culturels sont tenus de demeurer simples et accessibles à tous – et à la presse pour commencer. Au royaume où il est, dit-on, quelque chose de « pourri », difficile d’imposer son point de vue en arguant, même symboliquement, de son statut, de son rang, de son autorité.
(translated by Sussy ERRERA et Thomas ADAMS)
[1] Par « acteur constitutionnel », nous entendrons toute personne (juristes, responsables politiques, électeurs, pétitionnaires, manifestants, etc.) participant à la formulation, à l’adoption ou à l’interprétation des règles ou usages constitutionnels, que sa participation soit juridiquement organisée ou non.
[2] A. Molitor, La fonction royale en Belgique , Bruxelles, CRISP, 1979.
[3] Sur la manière dont la tradition française phagocyte la fonction judiciaire, voir J.-P. Airut : « Le juge dans le ruisseau : la faute aux profs ou à Rousseau ? » , Crises, n° 4, Paris, P.U.F., 1994, p. 111-134.
[4] M. Grawitz, J. Leca, Traité de Science politique, 4 vol., Paris, P.U.F.
[5] « Toutes ces compétences qui sont conformes aux attributions du chef de l’État dans le régime parlementaire classique n’appellent guère d’observations puisque évidemment elles sont nominales et sont passées en fait, selon l’évolution commune, au gouvernement », Ibid., p. 263.
[6] « Souvent on préférera sauvegarder les apparences (…) et la Constitution confiera au chef de l’État des attribution nombreuses et importantes étant entendu qu’il n’en est que le titulaire formel », Philippe Ardant, in Dictionnaire constitutionnel, P.U.F., 1992, p. 123.
[7] P. Ardant, Ibid.
[8] Pierre Pactet, Institutions politiques et Droit constitutionnel, Masson, Paris, 1991, p. 380.
« She is the symbolic embodiment of the state and nation », David L. Sills, « Monarchy « , in International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, The Mac Millan Company and the Free Press, 1968.
[9] R. Fusilier, Les pays nordiques, LGDJ, Paris, 1965, p. 284.
(si ce n’est « horticoles » s’agissant du Président de la République parlementaire, grand « inaugurateur de chrysanthèmes » comme chacun sait depuis le mot du général de Gaulle)
[10] G. Burdeau, op. cit., t. IX, p. 225.
[11] « … la Couronne a perdu progressivement tous ses pouvoirs réels, qui ont été transférés au Parlement (…) Le souverain reste en principe le chef de l’État mais joue en réalité un rôle purement symbolique. Le détenteur effectif du pouvoir est le Gouvernement (…) », M. Duverger, Systèmes et régimes politiques, Robert Laffont, 1976.
[12] « Seulement ce pouvoir (celui du monarque constitutionnel) joue comme principe moral, comme agent de cohésion, comme symbole », G. Burdeau, op. cit., t. IV, p. 114.
[13] « Le roi inaugure les chrysanthèmes. Il est vrai qu’on le compare souvent à une potiche couronnée, lorsque l’on veut démontrer l’inutilité du système monarchique », S. Bern, L’Europe des rois, France Loisirs, Paris, 1988, p. 171. N.B. Cet ouvrage-ci n’est pas celui d’un spécialiste.
[14] G. Burdeau, op. cit., t. I, p. 225.
[15] » En réalité, dans les monarchies qui se sont maintenues en dépit d’une effectivité toujours plus grande de la souveraineté du peuple (…) le droit (…) propre du souverain (…) demeure dans un arrière-plan mystérieux », G. Burdeau, op. cit., t. V, p. 114.
[16] A. Molitor, Op. cit., p. 7.
[17] « Car la notion de symbole — n’est-ce-pas — est tout entière nôtre (…). Voilà longtemps que nous pensons (Durkheim et l’auteur) que l’un des caractères du fait social c’est précisément son aspect symbolique », M. Mauss, Sociologie et anthropologie, Paris, P.U.F, 1983, p. 294.
[18] « Toute culture peut être considérée comme un ensemble de systèmes symboliques au premier rang desquels se placent le langage, les règles matrimoniales », C. Lévi-Strauss, in Marcel Mauss, Ibid., p. XIX.
[19] M. Grawitz, Lexique des sciences sociales, Dalloz, Paris, 1990, p. 370.
[20] « Tous ces systèmes (…) symboliques et constitutifs de la culture (…) visent à exprimer certains aspects de la réalité physique et de la réalité sociale » , rappelle Claude Lévi-Strauss, in Marcel Mauss, op. cit., p. XIX (souligné par nous, JPA).
[21] Cette dévalorisation pourrait expliquer pourquoi on ne dénombre pas plus d’un article sur le symbole dans les numéros des quatre dernières années de quatre revues juridiques (Droit et Cultures , Droit et Société , Pouvoirs ; Revue française de droit constitutionnel ). Encore cet article s’intéresse-t-il moins au symbole proprement dit qu’à la réalité -l’inconscient- dont il est censé être le symptôme (Cf. Jean-Thierry Maertens, “Les mutilations rituelles, en corps et toujours” in Droit et Cultures, n° 20, 1990, p. 163-177). La récente étude de Falih Mahdi (« Symboles du châtiment chez Hammourabi, Moïse et Mahomet », Revue internationale de Philosophie pénale et de Criminologie de l’Acte, n° 5, 1994, p. 123-130) sur la symbolique des peines prévues par Hammourabi, la Bible et le Coran ne fait pas non plus véritablement exception. Si elle compare les symboles exploitées par chacune des traditions pénales considérées, c’est moins pour étudier leur efficacité propre (pédagogique ou répressive, par exemple) que pour confirmer, sur la base des similitudes révélées, l’influence du droit babylonien sur le droit biblique.
[22] Sur les relations de l’histoire de la pensée et du couple signifiant/signifié, voir J.-P. Airut, « Is Karl Marx’s Theory of Exploitation based on Natural law ? », in Roberta Kevelson, Law and the Conflict of Ideologies, New York, Peter Lang, 1996, p. 11-24.
[23] Lynn Hunt, The New Cultural History , Berkeley, University of California Press, 1989.
[24]Voir, par exemple, Antoine de Baecque, Le corps de l’Histoire, métaphores et politique (1770-1800), Calmann-Lévy, Paris, 1993. Pour un bilan critique de ces approches, voir Roger Chartier, « Le monde comme représentation « , in Annales, E.S.C., nov. 1989, p. 1505-1520.
[25] « During the Revolution, even the most ordinary objects and customs became political emblems and potentiel sources of political and social conflict. (…) Such symbols did not simply express political positions ; they were the means by which people became aware of their positions. By making a political position manifest, they made adherence, opposition and indifference possible. In this way, they constituted a field of political struggle », Lynn Hunt, Politics, Cultre an Class in the French Revolution, Berkeley, Los Angeles, London, University of California Press, 1984, p. 53 (souligné par nous, JPA).
[25] Dictionnaire encyclopédique de théorie et de sociologie du droit, op. cit., p. 108.
« L’expression « droit constitutionnel », comme le mot « droit » lui-même, est ambivalente en ceci qu’elle désigne d’une part un ensemble de règles et, d’autre part, « la science de ce corps de règles » », Dictionnaire constitutionnel, op. cit., p. 320.
[26] Pour les principaux effets par lesquels le drapeau agit sur la conscience et le comportement national des individus, c.f. J.-P. Airut, « Drapeau français et sentiment national : le chant du cygne ? » , Crises, n° 2, Paris, P.U.F., 1994, p. 131-154.
[27] « Les juges ne sont pas en droit de s’ériger en procureurs des comportements (…) mais de mettre au jour , puis de sanctionner des infractions », Edwy Plenel, Ibid.
[28]« Rule : a principle or regulation governing conduct, action, procedure (…) », The Random House Dictionary, vol. 2, New York, 1983, p. 1681.
Voir aussi Cassell’s English Dictionary, Cassel, London, 1975 : « law, a rule of conduct imposed by authority or accepted by the community as binding », p. 663 ; « rule, that which is established as principle, a standard or guide of action or procedure , p. 1002 (souligné par nous, JPA).
[29] « Le mot droit désigne l’ensemble des règles juridiques applicables aux actes et aux faits accomplis par les hommes (…) soit une faculté accordée à une personne de faire un acte déterminé », Dictionnaire de Droit, Paris, Dalloz,1966, t. I, p. 635.
[30] Dans son article sur Hans Kelsen, Michel Troper met en valeur les dérives « abstraction-nistes » de la Théorie pure du Droit . « La théorie pure (…) prend pour point de départ une analyse de la norme juridique qu’elle définit comme un schéma d’interprétation (…) La norme n’est pas un acte humain (…) mais seulement la signification d’un énoncé », Dictionnaire des Philosophes, Paris, P.U.F., 1984 (souligné par nous, JPA).
[31] Le droit recourt parfois aux armes de ses rivaux. A travers l’exécution forcée, il fait — sans pour autant se confondre avec le « droit du plus fort » — lui aussi violence. Pour s’épargner le coût moral et financier de l’exécution forcée, il emprunte aux techniques de persuasion grâce auxquelles il convainc la majorité de reproduire spontanément ses modèles. Son « positionnement marketing » ainsi que sa « stratégie de communication » lui sont néanmoins spécifiques.
[32] De nos jours, surtout les dimanches d’été et en province plus qu’à Copenhague.
[33] J.-P. Airut, « Danskernes Flagmani », in Samvirke, n° 6-7, Copenhague, 1992, p. 6-10.
[34] « La monarchie est naturellement surtout un symbole, mais elle n’est pas uniquement cela. Comme dans les autres pays parlementaires, la monarchie est une puissance que l’on garde en réserve. Elle jouit d’une grande estime et le monarque a, comme le disait l’anglais Bagehot, il y a cent ans, le droit d’être consulté, le droit d’encourager et le droit de dissuader. En pratique, ce sont des droits qui peuvent revêtir une certaine importance. (…) Certaines questions essentielles ou qui l’intéressent pour des raisons personnelles, sont toujours portées devant le Roi (…) le Roi peut toujours demander que le conseil soit convoqué pour entendre ses objections et donc que ses avis soient pris en considération. Cela peut avoir des conséquences assez profondes », Gunnar Heckscher, Démocratie efficace, l’expérience politique et sociale de pays scandinaves , Privât, 1957.
[35] « Si le roi du Danemark, Christian X, resta dans le pays, il adopta une ferme attitude vis-à-vis des occupants, et si des heurts se produisirent avec le cabinet, ce fut avec celui dirigé par Scavenius, lequel ne disposait d’aucun soutien dans le pays », R. Fusilier, Les pays nordiques, Paris, LGDJ, 1965, p. 288-289.
[36] Très suivie entre 1866 et 1905, la fête de la Constitution (5 juin) ne donne plus lieu à des manifestations publiques. Bien que Uffe Andreasen et Anne Mette Christiansen écrivent qu’elle est « ce qui se rapproche le plus de la notion de fête nationale officielle » (La Constitution du Danemark 150 ans. La France et la Constitution danoise du 5 juin 1849, Ministère Royal des Affaires étrangères, Copenhague, 1999, p. 29), elle ne nous paraît rivaliser ni avec la fête de la reine ni même avec celle du drapeau qui se traduisent, l’une et l’autre, par une authentique participation du peuple.
[37] Sur les relations entre le culte du drapeau et les religions catholique ou protestante, voir : J.-P. Airut, « L’usage des couleurs nationales dans la rue danoise : facteur de sociabilité interpersonnelle, politique ou protestante ? », in A. Leménorel éd., La rue, lieu de sociabilité ?, Actes du Colloque des 16-19 novembre 1994, Rouen, Presses universitaires de Rouen, 1997, p. 243-252.
[38] Sur les mutations des rapports unissant les Français à leur drapeau, voir note n° 26.
[39] Dans une étude de 130 pages, rédigée, en 1993, pour le Ministère de l’Intérieur français, Mohamed Bengaouer, inspecteur général de l’Administration, estime que les collectivités locales danoises, ne disposant pas toujours des moyens correspondant à leurs prérogatives, restent dépendantes du pouvoir central. La décentralisation de la vie danoise serait ainsi, et en partie du moins, une fiction.
[40] J.-P. Airut, « Au Danemark, la convivialité ne suffit plus », Le Monde de l’Éducation, février 1993.
[41] « La politique scandinave est d’une honnêteté scrupuleuse (…) Elle offre peu de surprises. Elle porte le plus souvent sur des questions de détail, au sujet desquels on recherche des compromis. Enfin, c’est une politique où tout le monde essaie de collaborer dans le travail », G. Heckscher, op. cit., p. 46.
[42] « Car ce roi (Christian X) , chaque matin, aimait à se promener seul en ville, et à discuter devant une bière. (…) La reine habite les quais, à peine mieux logée que ses sujets. Amalienborg est sans doute le plus modeste des palais (…) Les Copenhaguois ont tout loisir, les soirs d’été, de venir se réjouir de l’intimité de leur reine, par les fenêtres éclairées. Un réconfort, paraît-il. Presque une vie de foyer moyen qu’on aime à comparer avec les fastes, si peu danois ceux-là, de l’ambassade de France (…) Elle fait elle-même ses courses en ville, partage le même salon de coiffure que les militantes féministes. Le chauffeur de sa voiture, une Daimler portant le numéro 121, égayée d’une discrète couronne, règle le prix du parking. Elle déjeune au milieu des convives (des restaurants), sans provoquer de réactions », Philippe Boggio, « Copenhague, la tentation d’exister », Le Monde, 17 novembre 1990, p. 21-24.
[43] « Face à la défaite, la naissance d’une princesse (la reine Margrethe) fit l’effet d’un rayon de soleil, d’un heureux présage. Le peuple danois s’était massé devant le palais d’Amalienborg pour adresser ses félicitations à la famille royale; il s’agissait en fait d’une manifestation silencieuse de patriotisme. » La dynastie représentait pour le peuple « l’espérance d’un avenir meilleur. N’a-t-on pas du reste donné à la petite princesse le prénom de Margrethe (Marguerite), la fleur qui symbolise la résistance ? », S. Bern, op. cit., p. 109-110.
[44] Montesquieu, De l’esprit des lois, Livre III, “Des principes des trois gouvernements”, Paris, Gallimard, 1970, p. 59-73.